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The Nature and Methodological Implications 
of the Cognitive Representation of Products 
MICHAEL D. JOHNSON 
CLAES FORNELL* 
A general relationship is proposed wherein more abstract attributes are likely to 
resemble continuous dimensions while more concrete attributes are likely to resemble 
dichotomous features. While some methodc!ogies assume dimensional represen- 
tations, others assume feature-based representations. This suggests that dimen- 
sional methods may better capture abstract product representations while feature- 
based methods may better capture concrete representations. The results of two 
studies that support both the general relationship and its methodological implications 
are reported. 
C onsumer research often focuses on individuals' 
cognitive representations of products. To gain in- 
sight into these representations, a variety of research 
methods have been used, including similarity scaling 
(Green and Rao 1972), discriminant analysis (Johnson 
1971), and factor analysis (Hauser and Urban 1977). 
Two important and separate distinctions are often 
drawn to describe the product attributes within these 
representations: concreteness-abstractness (Hirschman 
1983; Howard 1977; Johnson 1984), and continuous 
dimensions vs. dichotomous features (Cooper 1973; 
Green, Wind, and Claycamp 1975; Johnson 1981). 
Previous research has not, however, considered the 
possible relationship between these distinctions. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the general 
relationship between these two important distinctions 
and its implications. Two considerations are central to 
this relationship. First, dimensions capture or contain 
many features just as abstract attributes capture or con- 
tain much concrete information. Second, given human 
information processing limitations, a large number of 
concrete attributes may be represented using simple 
features while fewer, more abstract attributes may be 
represented in a more complex, dimensional fashion. 
As a result, abstract attributes may be more likely to 
resemble dimensions while more concrete attributes 
may be more akin to features. 
This theoretical relationship has important meth- 
odological implications. The feature-dimension dis- 
tinction is implicit in the use of different methods, par- 
ticularly similarity scaling procedures (Carroll 1976; 
Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll 1982). If, in fact, con- 
crete attributes resemble features while abstract attri- 
butes resemble dimensions, procedures that implicitly 
assume features may better capture proximity judg- 
ments based on more concrete representations. Like- 
wise, procedures that assume dimensions may better 
capture judgments based on more abstract product rep- 
resentations. As a result, the relative usefulness of 
methods may vary depending on whether the analysis 
is aimed at a more concrete brand level or at a more 
abstract product market boundary level. In order to un- 
derstand better the very nature of competition and 
market boundaries, it is essential to know how consum- 
ers represent and compare products at these different 
levels of abstraction (Johnson 1986). 
After discussing each distinction in more detail, the 
relationship between concreteness-abstractness and the 
feature-dimension distinction is described. Experi- 
ments are then presented that test the relationship both 
in a direct, theoretical fashion and a more applied, 
methodological fashion. 
CONCRETENESS-ABSTRACTNESS 
Although various definitions of concreteness-ab- 
stractness exist, following Paivio (1971), we view ab- 
stractness as the inverse of how directly an attribute 
denotes particular objects or events, and we equate 
concreteness-abstractness with the specificity-gener- 
ality of terms and the subordination-superordination 
of categories. In the context of product attributes, 
Johnson (1984) argues in a similar vein that abstract 
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attributes are more general and imply a summarizing 
or concentration of information. For example, a tele- 
vision's value on one abstract attribute, such as enter- 
tainment, summarizes or captures several concrete at- 
tribute values, such as screen size, number of speakers, 
and color quality. Consistent with this, Rosch et al. 
(1976) define more abstract categories as being more 
inclusive or superordinate. Rosch et al. (see also Mervis 
and Rosch 1981) use levels of abstraction to indicate 
points at which basic category distinctions are made. 
The importance of abstraction is reflected by its role in 
a variety of psychological research domains, including 
that of verbal learning (Paivio 1971) and categorization 
(Murphy and Smith 1982; Rosch 1975, 1977; Rosch et 
al. 1976; Tversky and Hemenway 1984). Rokeach 
(1973; see also Howard 1977) also uses concreteness- 
abstractness to distinguish among instrumental and 
terminal human values. Instrumental values are con- 
sidered to be more concrete values of "doing," while 
terminal values are more abstract values of "being." 
Traditionally, consideration of the concreteness-ab- 
stractness of products and product attributes in mar- 
keting has been concentrated in discussions of the do- 
mains of marketing and consumer research, market 
segmentation, and consumer judgment and choice. In 
discussing the limited domain of consumer research, 
Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) recently argued that 
tangible product attributes, such as calories in a soft 
drink or miles per gallon in an automobile, have been 
studied to the exclusion of important experiential as- 
pects of consumption, such as cheerfulness and socia- 
bility. Although abstractness as defined here and tan- 
gibility are conceptually distinct, their argument and 
examples do suggest that consumer researchers have 
focused on concrete attributes while often ignoring im- 
portant abstract attributes. (For a similar discussion see 
Hirschman 1983.) 
A similar view emerges from discussions of market 
segmentation. In his seminal article, Haley (1968) urged 
managers to concentrate more on abstract product 
benefits than on concrete, descriptive product factors 
when segmenting consumer markets. This view of seg- 
mentation is also consistent with existing economic 
views of consumer and human behavior (Becker 1976; 
Lancaster 1971). Both Becker and Lancaster theorize 
that individuals derive utility from the "characteristics" 
that goods possess rather than from the goods them- 
selves. One does not, for example, obtain utility directly 
from either an automobile or from gasoline, but rather 
from the "transportation" that they together provide. 
As utility is derived directly from these relatively ab- 
stract benefits or characteristics, it is logical that seg- 
mentation occur at this level for many products. 
Beginning with Bettman's (1974), Boote's (1975), and 
Howard's (1977) work on hierarchical choice, and more 
recently evidenced in Johnson's (1984) study of non- 
comparable choice, concreteness-abstractness has pre- 
figured in the study of consumer choice. Howard, for 
example, views consumer choice as a more or less hi- 
erarchical process where different levels of choice in a 
hierarchy are considered to be at different levels of ab- 
straction. Higher level choices occur among more ab- 
stract alternatives, such as product categories, while 
lower level choices occur among more concrete alter- 
natives such as brands within a category. This view is 
consistent with the definition of abstraction as being 
equivalent to the subordination-superordination of 
categories. 
Howard goes beyond the simple notion of a choice 
hierarchy to posit that there exists a corresponding 
evaluative hierarchy of choice criteria; consumers 
choose criteria in the evaluative hierarchy at a level of 
abstraction that corresponds to the level of the choice. 
Thus, a direct relationship is hypothesized between the 
abstractness of choice alternatives and the abstractness 
of choice criteria. Boote (1975) found indirect support 
for this hypothesis. In Boote's study, subjects rated the 
relative importance of Rokeach's instrumental and ter- 
minal values to both product category and brand-level 
choices. Consistent with Howard's hypothesis, the more 
concrete instrumental values were judged as more im- 
portant to brand-level choices while the more abstract 
terminal values were judged as more important to 
product category level choices. 
Howard's hypothesis can be generalized beyond 
choice and choice criteria. In general, the abstractness 
of descriptive attributes within a product representation 
should increase directly with the abstractness of the 
product. This hypothesis is consistent with other theo- 
retical arguments, including those in human memory 
(Collins and Loftus 1975), and specifically the notion 
of cognitive economy. Cognitive economy implies that 
concept or category nodes in memory are at the same 
level of abstraction or generality as their immediately 
associated attributes. The economy is realized by rep- 
resenting category-wide knowledge at the category 
nodes rather than at each of the subordinate nodes. 
Recently, Johnson (1984), noting that choice is not 
always hierarchical, studied choices involving specific 
alternatives from different product categories, or "non- 
comparable" alternatives. Johnson hypothesized a 
continuum of attributes from the concrete to the ab- 
stract in which increasingly abstract attributes describe 
an increasing number of products. Specific alternatives 
from different categories, initially noncomparable or 
described on different concrete nonprice attributes, may 
be made comparable by representing the alternatives at 
a higher level of abstraction. The more noncomparable 
the alternatives are on nonprice attributes, the higher 
the level of abstraction required to make comparisons. 
While two stereos might be compared on speaker size, 
and a stereo and a television might be compared on 
entertainment value, a stereo and a refrigerator may 
only be comparable on necessity or practicality. John- 
This content downloaded from 132.236.173.158 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 16:54:23 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
216 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 
son found support for subjects abstracting product rep- 
resentations to a level where comparability exists in 
order to make within-attribute comparisons. As the 
comparability of alternatives decreased, there were cor- 
responding increases in the abstractness of choice at- 
tributes. 
An important implication of abstraction is that as 
representations become more abstract, and individual 
attributes contain more and more information, it should 
follow that the number of attributes in a representation 
decrease (Johnson 1984). Although some information 
may be lost in the abstraction process, roughly the same 
amount of information is contained in a few abstract 
attributes as in many more concrete attributes. The 
studies conducted by Boote (1975) involving brand- 
level (concrete) versus category-level (abstract) choices, 
and by Johnson (1984) involving choice alternatives 
varying in comparability, support this decrease in rel- 
evant aspects with attribute abstraction. 
FEATURES AND DIMENSIONS 
We may better understand representations that vary 
in concreteness-abstractness by simultaneously con- 
sidering the distinction between features and dimen- 
sions. While dimensions are continuous attributes on 
which objects differ as a matter of degree, features are 
dichotomous attributes that objects either have or do 
not have (Garner 1978; Restle 1959; Tversky 1977). 
Tversky (1977; see also Gati and Tversky 1982, 1984; 
Tversky and Gati 1982) argues that many stimuli (such 
as countries) are naturally described using features while 
others are naturally described by dimensions (such as 
colors). Generally, he suggests that conceptual stimuli 
may be more feature-based in their representations 
while perceptual stimuli may be more dimensionally 
based (an issue we shall return to shortly). 
The use of features or dimensions is also, however, 
often a matter of choice. For example, one may either 
represent soft-drinks as having varying degrees of cola 
flavor, indicating the use of a dimension, or simply rep- 
resent some soft drinks as colas, indicating the use of a 
feature. Thus, inherently dimensional attributes may 
be mapped into simpler, feature-based representations 
(Gati and Tversky 1982). A recent study by Johnson 
and Tversky (1984) illustrates how subjects' represen- 
tations may depend on the judgment tasks they are re- 
quired to perform. Subjects in the study made similarity 
judgments, conditional predictions, and dimensional 
evaluations among a set of risky alternatives. While both 
the similarity judgments and conditional predictions 
were better explained by additive tree models, indicating 
feature-based representations, the dimensional evalu- 
ations were better explained by multidimensional scal- 
ing and factor analysis, indicating the use of dimen- 
sional representations. The authors suggest that subjects 
are more likely to use feature-based representations the 
more holistic the required judgment. 
CONCRETENESS-ABSTRACTNESS 
AND THE FEATURE-DIMENSION 
DISTINCTION 
While more abstract or noncomparable products may 
be represented using more abstract attributes, there is 
also reason to believe that a general relationship exists 
between the concreteness-abstractness of attributes and 
the use of features or dimensions. Central to this rela- 
tionship is the property of inclusion that underlies both 
distinctions. Consider that one dimension may capture 
or contain information about several features. The op- 
posite is less likely to be true. Therefore, just as one 
abstract attribute captures or includes several more 
concrete attributes, so does a single dimension capture 
several features. This is consistent with Gati and Tver- 
sky's (1982) notion that a dimension can be represented 
as a set of nested features (while they do not argue that 
a feature may be represented as a set of nested dimen- 
sions) and Green et al.'s (1975) suggestion that groups 
of features are captured by or map into more basic (and 
presumably abstract) dimensions. The inherent simi- 
larity between these two important distinctions suggests 
that more abstract attributes are more likely represented 
as dimensions, while more concrete attributes are more 
likely represented as features. 
A separate yet convergent argument can be made by 
considering that, first, features are relatively simple 
compared to dimensions (Garner 1978), and second, 
we face a limited information processing capacity. Be- 
cause features have but two levels (Garner 1978; Restle 
1959), their representation may require less processing 
capacity than the representation of continuous dimen- 
sions. Feature-based representations may, therefore, be 
more likely as the number of attributes in a represen- 
tation increases. Because a concrete representation re- 
quires more aspects or attributes than an abstract rep- 
resentation to capture approximately the same amount 
of information (Johnson 1984), consumers may be 
more likely to use feature-based representations as a 
means of staying within a limited information process- 
ing capacity. In other words, values on concrete di- 
mensions, such as level of gas mileage or price, may be 
mapped into dichotomous features, such as whether or 
not a vehicle is "fuel efficient" or "expensive," for the 
sake of simplicity. 
Thus, for reasons inherent to both the distinctions 
and our processing ability, a direct relationship is hy- 
pothesized between the concreteness-abstractness of the 
attributes in a representation and the use of features or 
dimensions. This hypothesis is only expected to hold, 
however, in a general sense. It does not exclude the 
possibility of concrete dimensions or abstract features. 
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Certain stimuli may be more naturally described by 
features or dimensions irrespective of their concrete- 
ness-abstractness. Representations may also be modi- 
fied as required by the task at hand. 
The experiments described below test the general re- 
lationships among the abstractness of products, their 
attributes, and the use of features or dimensions. John- 
son (1984) previously showed that product attributes 
become increasingly abstract as products become more 
noncomparable (dissimilar). The relationship between 
product abstractness (category level) and attribute ab- 
straction has not, however, been directly tested. While 
Boote's (1975) study provides indirect support for this 
hypothesis using Rokeach's instrumental and terminal 
values, a more direct test of the hypothesis involves 
using actual consumer product attributes. Therefore, 
the experiments below involve the use of actual product 
attributes to test the following hypothesis: 
Hi: The level of abstraction of product represen- 
tations (descriptive attributes) should increase 
as products become more abstract. 
Our second hypothesis concerns the abstractness of the 
attribute representation and the related use of features 
or dimensions. 
H2: The use of continuous dimensions as opposed 
to dichotomous features should increase as 
product representations become more ab- 
stract. 
On the surface, this hypothesis seems contradictory 
to recent findings in psychology concerning the repre- 
sentation of conceptual versus perceptual stimuli. The 
results of both Pruzansky, Tversky, and Carroll (1982) 
and Tversky and Hutchinson (1986) suggest that di- 
mensional space representations are more appropriate 
for perceptual stimuli (e.g., colors, tones), while feature 
tree representations are more appropriate for conceptual 
stimuli (e.g., occupations). If we view conceptual stimuli 
as more abstract than perceptual stimuli, then these re- 
sults seem contradictory to those predicted by our sec- 
ond hypothesis. 
There are at least two important differences, however, 
between the representation of concrete versus abstract 
products and the representation of perceptual versus 
conceptual stimuli as reported by Pruzansky et al. and 
Tversky and Hutchinson. First is the inherent quali- 
tative difference between the two distinctions. Our dis- 
cussion and definition of concreteness-abstractness fo- 
cus on variations in abstraction within the domain of 
product concepts, ranging from concrete brands to more 
abstract product categories. It is problematic, therefore, 
to equate perceptual stimuli, such as colors or tones, 
with brand-level concepts. In fact, consistent with the 
results of Pruzansky et al. and Tversky and Hutchinson, 
feature tree representations may, on average, provide 
better representations of product concepts. At the same 
time, our hypothesis predicts that spatial representa- 
tions will become more appropriate, in a relative fash- 
ion, as these products become more abstract.' 
A second problem with equating concrete product 
concepts and perceptual stimuli centers on the number 
of aspects within a representation. Recall that one rea- 
son why abstract product representations are hypoth- 
esized as more dimensional is because fewer aspects are 
involved. As a result, they may be represented in a more 
complex, dimensional fashion, given our information- 
processing limitations. This argument is consistent with 
one explanation of the findings in Pruzansky et al. and 
Tversky and Hutchinson. The representation of con- 
ceptual stimuli, such as occupations, generally requires 
the use of more underlying aspects than does the rep- 
resentation of perceptual stimuli, such as a series of 
tones or colors. In addition, representations based on 
more aspects may be better captured or approximated 
by a large number of features, and hence a feature-based 
tree representation, than by a small number of contin- 
uous dimensions, as in a dimensional space (Tversky 
and Hutchinson 1986). Thus one reason why feature 
trees may be superior to dimensional spaces for con- 
ceptual as opposed to perceptual stimuli might be the 
same reason why trees may be superior to spaces for 
concrete as opposed to abstract product representa- 
tions.' 
Three levels of product abstraction are used to test 
the hypotheses. These include superordinate level (ab- 
stract), category level (intermediate), and brand level 
(concrete) stimuli. This is consistent with Kotler's 
(1984) generic, form, and brand competition distinc- 
tions. Stimuli were chosen from three separate super- 
ordinate category types-home entertainment, domes- 
tic appliance, and mode of transportation. The stimuli 
included, from the abstract to the concrete, home en- 
tertainment device, television, and Sony television for 
the home entertainment category; domestic appliance, 
refrigerator, and General Electric refrigerator for the 
domestic appliance category; and mode of transporta- 
tion, bicycle, and Schwinn bicycle for the mode of 
transportation category. (The specific brands used in 
' It is possible, albeit speculative, to place both distinctions on one 
more general concreteness-abstractness continuum. This continuum 
may range from the extremely concrete (perceptual stimuli) to some 
intermediate level (concrete concepts) to the extremely abstract (ab- 
stract concepts). The result may then be a nonmonotonic relationship 
between abstractness and the use of dimensional representations. Ex- 
tremely concrete and extremely abstract stimuli may be more di- 
mensional while stimuli at an intermediate level may be more feature- 
based. 
2 Tversky and Hutchinson provide two additional explanations of 
their findings. First, the inherent hierarchical nature of conceptual, 
as opposed to perceptual, stimuli may be more consistent with hi- 
erarchical, feature tree representations. Feature trees may also be 
better at representing common features while, at the same time, such 
common features are weighted more heavily in representations of 
conceptual than perceptual stimuli (Gati and Tversky 1984). 
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the study were chosen on the basis of frequency of men- 
tion after asking a random sample of 50 University of 
Michigan students for the brands in each category with 
which they were most familiar.) 
These three levels of product abstractness correspond 
roughly to the superordinate, basic, and subordinate 
level stimuli used in many studies of categorization in 
psychology (Murphy and Smith 1982; Rosch et al. 1976; 
Tversky and Hemenway 1984). An important finding 
in these studies is the central importance of basic-level 
categories. In their seminal article, Rosch et al. argue 
that basic-level categories are at a level of abstraction 
that carries the most information and that, as a result, 
most differentiates objects from one another. Category 
distinctions below this basic level (e.g., subordinate cat- 
egories) add relatively little information. In support of 
their argument, these authors report on a series of ex- 
periments that find relatively large differences in ab- 
straction (inclusiveness) between superordinate- and 
basic-level categories and relatively small differences 
between basic-level and subordinate-level categories. 
Specifically, they found that many new descriptive at- 
tributes are added in going from a superordinate to a 
basic level, but few are added in going from a basic to 
a subordinate level. Both Murphy and Smith (1982) 
and Tversky and Hemenway (1984) obtained similar 
results. 
This suggests that if Hypothesis 1 is supported, larger 
differences may be observed between superordinates 
and categories than between categories and brands. 
Unfortunately, although our superordinate and cate- 
gory levels are equivalent to Rosch et al.'s superordinate 
and basic levels, respectively, we can not equate our 
brand-level stimuli with Rosch et al.'s subordinate-level 
stimuli. Therefore, although larger differences might be 
expected between our superordinate category and cat- 
egory levels than between our category and brand levels 
(given the "basic category" nature of our categories), 
we do not make any explicit prediction regarding the 
difference in abstractness of product attributes from 
level to level. 
Two studies were conducted to test our hypotheses. 
In the first, subjects were asked to freely elicit attributes 
associated with products at each of the three levels of 
abstraction. A separate group of judges was then asked 
to classify these attributes according to whether they 
constitute features or dimensions. Basically, this ex- 
periment examines the relationship between abstract 
products and abstract attributes and whether abstract 
attributes resemble dimensions rather than features. 
As suggested, the results of the first experiment may 
have important methodological implications for the 
study of cognitive representations via perceptual map- 
ping. Two of the most frequently used approaches- 
multidimensional scaling and clustering procedures- 
implicitly make different assumptions about underlying 
cognitive representations (Carroll 1976; Pruzansky et 
al. 1982). Multidimensional scaling techniques look 
upon attributes as dimensions; clustering techniques, 
including hierarchical clustering and additive tree pro- 
cedures, view them as features. Consequently, our sec- 
ond hypothesis implies that multidimensional scaling 
should be more suitable for abstract attributes, and 
cluster analysis, for concrete attributes. This notion will 
be investigated in a second study where proximity data 
are fitted using both feature-based (additive tree) and 
space-based (multidimensional scaling) techniques. 
First, however, two pilot studies are described. 
PILOT STUDIES 
Two pilot studies conducted by Johnson and Kisielius 
(1985) provide initial support for our hypotheses. The 
first pilot study tested Hypothesis 1, and the second 
tested Hypothesis 2. The method and results of both 
studies are summarized briefly here. 
Johnson and Kisielius' pilot study 1 tested Hypothesis 
1 by determining the level of abstraction of attributes 
for products at different levels of abstraction. Product 
abstraction was operationalized by using products (de- 
scribed earlier) at three distinctly different category lev- 
els-superordinate (abstract), category (intermediate), 
and brand (concrete)-taken from three different cate- 
gory types: home entertainment, domestic appliance, and 
mode of transportation. Subjects were asked to indicate 
the five attributes that most easily came to mind, from 
first to fifth, in response to the different products. A list 
of 25 possible attributes ranging from the concrete to the 
abstract accompanied each product. These attributes 
were taken from a larger list of 248 attributes obtained 
from protocols in a separate study (Johnson 1984) in- 
volving stimuli from the same product categories. The 
original 248 attributes had been rated on a scale of zero 
(very concrete) to 10 (very abstract) by eight judges, and 
the attribute ratings were obtained by averaging across 
the judges (average interjudge correlation = 0.70). At- 
tributes were chosen to equally represent he entire range 
of concrete to abstract attributes. The five attributes 
mentioned most frequently by Johnson's subjects were 
selected in each category in each of five ranges of con- 
creteness-abstractness (0.0 to 2.00, 2.01 to 4.00, etc.). 
This resulted in three lists of 25 attributes, one for each 
of the three superordinate product categories. Attributes 
in each list were presented in random order. Subjects 
were instructed to indicate the five attributes among the 
25 attributes on a particular product's list that most easily 
came to mind when they thought about the product. A 
Latin-square design (see Experiment 1 below) was used 
(n = 128), and the results were tested using an analysis 
of variance model with level of abstraction of the chosen 
attributes as the dependent variable. 
The results of Johnson and Kisielius provide initial 
support for our Hypothesis 1. Overall, representations 
became more abstract the more abstract the product. 
Consistent with the results of Rosch et al. (1976), a com- 
parison of the factor-level means showed superordinate 
categories having significantly (p < 0.05) more abstract 
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representations than either categories or brands, and 
showed no significant difference between categories and 
brands (mean level of abstractness of 5.2, 4.1, and 4.2, 
respectively, for superordinate categories, categories, and 
brands). 
A second pilot study conducted by Johnson and Kis- 
ielius tests our second hypothesis (i.e., that more abstract 
attributes are more likely to be represented as dimensions 
while more concrete attributes are more likely to be rep- 
resented as features). The stimuli in this study included 
all 248 attributes from the Johnson (1984) study, rated 
from very concrete (0) to very abstract (10). Subjects 
were asked to classify the attributes on the basis of how 
they are "typically" used. Subjects classified an attribute 
as a feature if it was something a product typically either 
had or did not have. If the attribute was something on 
which products typically differed as a matter of degree, 
it was classified as a dimension. If subjects could not 
classify an attribute in one of the two categories, they 
were instructed to classify it as being used equally often 
as both. This intermediate classification was necessary, 
given the nature of the task. As subjects were instructed 
to classify on the basis of typical use (as opposed to use 
in describing a particular product), a strict feature or 
dimension classification was considered too restrictive. 
A total of 36 subjects completed the task. 
The level of abstraction of the classified attributes was 
used to test Hypothesis 2. As predicted, the mean level 
of abstraction was 3.0, 4.8, and 5.3, respectively, for the 
Feature, Both, and Dimension classifications. A dis- 
criminant analysis reveals that these means are all sig- 
nificantly different (F = 7.6 1; p < 0.0005). 
Together, these studies provide initial support for the 
hypotheses. Both studies are, however, very limited. A 
more ideal and direct test of the hypotheses would involve 
simultaneously testing the theoretical links between the 
concreteness-abstractness of products, their attributes, 
and the use of features or dimensions. We do not, for 
example, know whether the representations of subjects 
in pilot study 1 of Johnson and Kisielius did, in fact, 
involve feature-based or dimensional representations. 
The pilot studies also unnecessarily constrained the 
product representations. Subjects in pilot study 1 were 
not allowed to elicit representations naturally. The set 
of possible attributes was constrained to those obtained 
in a very different experimental context. The pilot studies 
rely heavily on the attributes taken from the choice pro- 
tocols of Johnson (1984) and their associated concrete- 
ness-abtractness ratings. Experiment 1, which we will 
now discuss, corrects for these problems. The hypotheses 
are tested simultaneously using the same unconstrained 
product representations. 
EXPERIMENT 1: PRODUCT 
REPRESENTATIONS 
Method 
In Experiment 1, subjects were asked to freely recall 
and list the attributes that most easily came to mind 
when they thought about the products in question. 
Again, three levels of product abstraction were used 
(superordinate category, category, and brand) within 
the three different superordinate category types (home 
entertainment, domestic appliance, transportation de- 
vice). Using paper and pencil, products were presented 
to subjects followed by a blank list numbered from one 
to five. Subjects were instructed to write down the 
product attribute that most easily came to mind in blank 
number one, the second attribute that came to mind in 
blank number two, and so on. Subjects were instructed 
to recall attributes one product at a time (each blank 
product attribute list was presented on a separate sheet 
of paper) and to spend no more than two minutes on 
any one product (to avoid the construction as opposed 
to the recall of associated attributes; Ericsson and Simon 
1980). Attributes were not forced; if subjects could not 
think of five attributes they simply moved on to the 
next product. 
Judges rated the different attributes listed by subjects 
on concreteness-abstractness to test Hypothesis 1. To 
test Hypothesis 2, separate judges classified the listed 
attributes according to whether they resembled features 
or dimensions. An attribute was classified as a feature 
if it was something the product in question either had 
or did not have, and as a dimension if it was something 
the product varied on as a matter of degree. Unlike 
Johnson and Kisielius's pilot study 2 in which judges 
classified attributes according to typical or general use, 
the judges in Experiment 1 classified attributes as stated 
by the test subjects. 
Design and Procedure 
Using a Latin-square design, each subject recalled 
attributes for three different products, each at a different 
level of abstraction, and each from a different category 
type. This design avoids any interference in recall that 
might occur by having the same subjects receive prod- 
ucts either at the same level of abstraction or products 
from the same category type. Each of the three stimulus 
conditions were also counterbalanced for order (one 
third of the subjects received the superordinate category 
first, one third received the category first, and one third 
received the brand first) resulting in nine experimental 
conditions overall. Subjects were 46 University of 
Michigan students who were paid for their participation. 
Responses from three subjects were dropped after they 
failed to perform the task as instructed. Using the data 
from the remaining 43 subjects, one group of judges 
rated the elicited attributes on concreteness-abstract- 
ness, while a second group of judges classified the at- 
tributes according to whether they constituted features 
or dimensions. 
Analysis 
Following Johnson (1984), concreteness-abstractness 
ratings were obtained by asking judges to rate the con- 
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creteness-abstractness of the 191 different attributes the 
subjects elicited on a scale from 0 (very concrete) to 10 
(very abstract). A convenience sample of 29 judges was 
recruited to rate the attributes. Consistent with our def- 
inition of attribute abstractness, the judges were in- 
structed to rate an attribute as very concrete if the at- 
tribute described some specific, particular aspect of a 
product and to rate an attribute as very abstract if the 
attribute was a more general description or overall 
evaluation of a product. A paper and pencil format was 
used. Six attributes were presented first as a warm-up, 
followed by the test attributes presented in random or- 
der. Judges were paid for their participation. 
Concreteness-abstractness ratings were operation- 
alized by averaging across the ratings ofjudges who were 
generally consistent in their judgments. Of the 29 
judges, one was thrown out because he failed to com- 
plete the task. Two judges were also dropped because 
of interjudge rating correlations well below the rest of 
the judges (r = 0.26 and 0.42). The remaining 26 judges 
had an average interjudge correlation of r = 0.62. As a 
manipulation check, the concreteness-abstractness 
ratings obtained by Johnson (1984) and used in the pilot 
studies were compared with those obtained here. The 
concreteness-abstractness ratings of identical attributes 
taken from the two studies were, in fact, very highly 
correlated (r = 0.94, n = 72). Therefore, although there 
is some inconsistency from judge to judge, averaging 
concreteness-abstractness ratings across even a small 
group of judges (only eight in the Johnson (1984) study 
and 26 here) produces a very reliable measure. 
Hypothesis 1 was tested using an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) model with main effects and one interaction 
term. The model tested for significant differences in the 
dependent variable-the level of abstraction of attri- 
butes recalled-with changes in the independent vari- 
ables. The independent variables included in the model 
were the level of product abstraction (three levels), cat- 
egory type (three levels), degree of association (five lev- 
els), a subjects factor (43 levels), stimulus order (three 
levels), and a level of abstraction by degree of association 
interaction term. The five levels of association reflect 
the order of elicitation of the attributes (i.e., whether 
the attribute was placed in blank one, two, three, four, 
or five). Naturally, the attributes subjects most easily 
associated with the products may be the most important 
and, therefore, deserve more attention. If the results are 
affected by the degree of association of the attributes, 
the outcome will either be a significant main effect for 
attribute association or a significant interaction between 
product abstraction and attribute association. 
For the purpose of testing Hypothesis 2, three sepa- 
rate and naive judges were asked to classify the attributes 
listed as features or dimensions. Those attributes on 
which all three judges were in complete agreement were 
used to test the hypothesis. The three judges agreed in 
classifying 483 of the 591 attributes (81.7 percent). The 
TABLE 1 
EXPERIMENT 1: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS 
df MS F (sign.) 
Abstraction 2 2,359.00 4.46 (.0120) 
Category type 2 1,647.85 3.12 (.0451) 
Subjects 42 1,284.91 2.43 (.0001) 
Stimulus order 2 779.49 1.47 (.2298) 
Association 4 185.75 0.35 (.8431) 
Abstraction 
X Association 8 497.19 0.94 (.4824) 
reliabilities among the judges (the probability that an 
attribute classification by one judge agrees with that of 
a second judge), were 0.87, 0.88, and 0.87, respectively, 
for judges 1 and 2, judges 1 and 3, and judges 2 and 3. 
The corresponding measure of agreement among all 
three pairs of judges, using Cohen's Kappa (see Bishop, 
Fienberg, and Holland 1975, p. 395), was 0.71 (signif- 
icant at p < 0.0001). To specifically test the hypothesis, 
Bartholomew's test for ordered proportions (see Fleiss 
1973, pp. 100-102) was used to determine whether the 
proportion of dimensions to total attributes increased 
from brands to categories to superordinate categories. 
Results 
The ANOVA results, presented in Table 1, support 
Hypothesis 1. Level of abstraction, subjects, and cate- 
gory type all had significant main effects (p < 0.05), 
with level of abstraction and subjects having the most 
significant overall effects. Consistent with the first pilot 
study of Johnson and Kisielius (1985), a Student-New- 
man-Keuls test for means shows superordinate cate- 
gories as significantly more abstract (p < 0.05) than 
either categories or brands with no difference between 
the latter pair (mean level of abstractness of 4.9, 4.4, 
and 4.2, respectively, for superordinate categories, cat- 
egories, and brands). Adding attributes of decreasing 
association has little systematic effect on the results, as 
indicated by the lack of a main effect for attribute as- 
sociation or significant interaction between level of ab- 
straction and association. 
The results of Bartholomew's test for order, reported 
in Table 2, support Hypothesis 2. Overall, the use of 
dimensions increased significantly from brands to cat- 
egories to superordinate categories. Consistent with all 
previous results, the proportion of dimensions to fea- 
tures increases much more from categories to super- 
ordinate categories than from brands to categories. 
There was a significant increase in the use of dimensions 
for stimuli in two individual categories-domestic ap- 
pliance and mode of transportation, but not for home 
entertainment. (In hindsight, the brand-level home en- 
tertainment stimulus, Sony television, was more ab- 
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TABLE 2 
EXPERIMENT 1: PROPORTION OF DIMENSIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
ACROSS PRODUCT LEVELS AND CATEGORIES 
Level of product abstraction 
Super- 
ordinate 
Product type Brand Category category Chiksquarea 
Home entertainment .21 .15 .28 2.181 
(38) (71) (45) 
Domestic appliance .15 .23 .87 90.344b 
(58) (47) (66) 
Mode of .15 .28 .43 10.526b 
transportation (61) (50) (44) 
Overall .17 .22 .47 39.828b 
(157) (168) (155) 
= Chi-square using Bartholomew's test for ordered proportions. 
b= Significant at p < 0.005. 
NOTE: Absolute number of dimensions given in parentheses. 
stract than the other brand-level stimuli due to a more 
frequent association of "quality" with Sony.) 
To summarize, Experiment 1 determined both the 
concreteness-abstractness and the feature-dimension 
classification of freely elicited product attributes. Sub- 
jects associated more abstract attributes to more abstract 
products, and these abstract attributes were more likely 
to resemble dimensions. Although superordinate cat- 
egories were much more likely to be abstract and di- 
mensional than either categories or brands, the differ- 
ences between categories and brands were much smaller. 
Considering the basic level of abstraction of our cate- 
gory-level stimuli, this result is very consistent with the 
finding that large changes in abstraction or inclusiveness 
do not exist below basic-level categories (Rosch et al. 
1976). In other words, the difference in abstractness of 
the attributes elicited by our subjects, and their asso- 
ciated use of features or dimensions, simply reflects the 
difference in the abstractness of the stimuli. 
EXPERIMENT 2: TREES VERSUS 
SPACES 
Perhaps one of the most important implications of 
these results is for methodology. The appropriateness 
of methodologies, particularly similarity scaling pro- 
cedures, should depend on the consumer's use of fea- 
ture-based or dimensional representations. As noted 
earlier (Carroll 1976; Pruzansky et al. 1982), while di- 
mensions are implicit in multidimensional scaling pro- 
cedures and resulting product spaces (Shocker and Sri- 
nivasan 1979), feature-based representations underlie 
many recent similarity scaling procedures, including 
hierarchical clustering, additive trees, and additive 
clustering (Tversky 1977). A very straightforward im- 
plication of the relationship between attribute abstrac- 
tion and the feature-dimension distinction is that di- 
mensional procedures such as multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) may be more appropriate for more abstract or 
noncomparable stimuli (which are represented using 
more abstract attributes), while feature-based, additive 
tree procedures such as ADDTREE (Sattath and Tver- 
sky 1977), may better fit more concrete, comparable 
stimuli (which are represented using more concrete at- 
tributes). 
We do not suggest relying on only one technique. 
Remember that the observed relationship does not ex- 
clude the possibility of important abstract features or 
concrete dimensions. Consumers are likely to use both 
features and dimensions when representing and eval- 
uating many products. Therefore, both types of pro- 
cedures, trees and spaces, should continue to reveal im- 
portant psychological aspects of any particular stimuli 
(Carroll 1976; Shepard 1980), including products that 
are relatively concrete or relatively abstract. In fact, re- 
searchers have long found it useful to embed represen- 
tations obtained via clustering within multidimensional 
scaling solutions (Shepard and Arabie 1979). The use 
of one technique or the other may also depend on rea- 
sonable presumptions regarding consumers' use of par- 
ticular judgment or choice strategies. A strategy such 
as elimination by aspects (Tversky 1972), for example, 
is very consistent with hierarchical trees (Tversky and 
Sattath 1979; Urban, Johnson, and Hauser 1984), while 
product spaces may be more consistent with more 
compensatory strategies (i.e., by representing a product 
as a point in a multidimensional space, more than one 
attribute is simultaneously considered). Finally, the 
representations may have very different strategic uses. 
Spaces may better reveal a product's position in a mar- 
ket, while trees may better reveal a market's competitive 
structure (see, for example, O'Shaughnessy 1984, 
Chapter 5). 
Nevertheless, attribute abstraction and the resulting 
use of features or dimensions has two important im- 
plications regarding the ability of similarity scaling 
procedures to "fit" proximity data. First, as fewer prod- 
uct attributes or aspects are probably used by consumers 
when judging more abstract or noncomparable alter- 
natives (Boote 1975; Johnson 1984), the fit of both fea- 
ture-based and dimensional procedures should improve. 
Second, as more abstract attributes also tend to be more 
dimensional, the improvement in fit with attribute ab- 
straction should be greater for dimensional techniques 
(MDS) than for feature-based techniques (ADDTREE). 
An important consideration here is that a switching over 
from features to dimensions in and of itself should not 
"hurt" the feature-based techniques as much as it 
"helps" those that assume dimensions. Dimensions may 
be approximated using a relatively small number of bi- 
nary features (Tversky and Hutchinson 1986). Having 
to use whole dimensions in a spatial configuration to 
capture particular features, however, should signifi- 
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cantly hurt the ability of multidimensional scaling to 
capture feature-based judgments. 
Method 
To test these implications, proximity judgments 
among various sets of stimuli whose descriptive attri- 
butes were likely to vary with respect to level of abstrac- 
tion were collected. Following the procedure of Sattath 
and Tversky (1977) and Pruzansky et al. (1982), each 
data set was analyzed using two scaling techniques: a 
multidimensional scaling technique (SSA; Smallest 
Space Analysis) assuming both two and three dimen- 
sions, and a feature-based additive tree procedure 
(ADDTREE). (Other forms of tree fitting mentioned 
earlier, including hierarchical clustering and additive 
clustering, could also be used. Sattath and Tversky 
(1977) describe the differences among these techniques.) 
For more equal comparison, the data were restricted to 
direct, overall similarity or dissimilarity judgments (i.e., 
no preference data, substitutabilities, etc.). A total of 
31 data sets were gathered and used in the experiment. 
Many of these (a total of 24) were collected by student 
teams as part of a consumer behavior course conducted 
by one of the authors. (The number of subjects ranged 
from a minimum of 25 to a maximum of 60, and judg- 
ments were averaged across subjects.) The remaining 
seven data sets were obtained from existing research 
articles, a research text, and a dissertation (Green and 
Rao 1972; Horne and Johnson 1986; Levine 1977; 
Lindquist 1972). As mentioned above, the criteria for 
selection was that the data involved overall judgments 
of similarity or dissimilarity. (Notice that these data 
sets are not systematically nested from superordinate 
categories to brands as was the case in Experiment 1. 
The sets do, however, include some nested categories 
whose operationalizations of abstractness (described 
later) generally go in the predicted direction.) 
Given the data sets, four variables require operation- 
alization: (1) the abstraction of the attributes on which 
the judgments are based, (2) the fit of the ADDTREE 
solutions, (3) the fit of the two-dimensional SSA solu- 
tions, and (4) the fit of the three-dimensional SSA so- 
lutions. Previous studies (Pruzansky et al. 1982; Sattath 
and Tversky 1977) have only compared the fit of ad- 
ditive tree solutions to two- and three-dimensional space 
solutions in order to keep the number of free parameters 
as comparable as possible in the two cases. A free tree 
procedure with a path length metric such as ADDTREE 
has approximately the same number of independent 
parameters as does a two-dimensional spatial configu- 
ration (see Carroll 1976 for a discussion). Although the 
number of free parameters is not equal for any two 
cases, of importance here is the independent relative 
improvement in the ability of trees and spaces to capture 
judgments involving increasingly abstract representa- 
tions. (We do not directly compare the fit of particular 
space-based and tree-based solutions that may differ in 
their degrees of freedom.) Again, the prediction is that 
attribute abstraction will positively affect the fit of both 
the ADDTREE and SSA solutions (due to a reduction 
in the number of attributes), but will have a greater 
positive impact on the SSA solutions (because abstract 
attributes are more dimensional). 
Attribute abstraction was operationalized by deter- 
mining the amount of variance explained in the simi- 
larity judgments by latent roots via principal compo- 
nents analysis. (Average similarities were normalized 
to a 0 to 1 scale for analysis.) Using the explanatory 
power of latent roots as a measure of abstractness fol- 
lows directly from Howard's notion of an attribute hi- 
erarchy. According to this notion, more abstract rep- 
resentations capture the same information using fewer 
aspects or attributes than do concrete representations 
(Howard 1977; Johnson 1984). More abstract repre- 
sentations should, therefore, be characterized by fewer, 
more explanatory roots. A more concrete representation 
should, on average, require more latent variables to 
achieve the same explanatory power. Therefore, the 
more variance explained by a small number of roots 
for a given stimulus set, the more abstract the repre- 
sentations used to produce the similarity judgments. 
In order to avoid making an arbitrary decision about 
how many latent roots to use, a multiple indicators ap- 
proach was chosen. Drawing from a procedure reported 
in Fornell and Robinson (1983), and discussed in For- 
nell (1986), a total of five indicators were employed 
where the first indicator was the variance explained by 
the first latent root, the second indicator was the vari- 
ance explained by the first two latent roots, and so on 
up to five roots (after extracting the fifth root, only a 
very small amount of variance was typically left). The 
basic idea is that when a latent variable (such as "ab- 
stractness") is to be used empirically, but when it cannot 
be considered synonymous with a corresponding set of 
measurement operations, and there are measures that 
bear some, albeit perhaps weak, relationship to the la- 
tent variable, a weighted index can be formed from these 
measures as long as they contain some relevant vari- 
ance. Such is the case with concentration indices mea- 
suring monopoly power in economics. Most analysts 
agree that concentration ratios are not good measures, 
but that they do contain some information about mo- 
nopoly power (Fornell 1986). The task, then, is to isolate 
this information in the estimation procedure. In this 
study, we consider each latent root indicator to contain 
some information about "abstractness," and we form 
an index by a linear combination of the indicators, 
weighted in such a way that the error variances of our 
analysis model (to be discussed next) will be minimized. 
The fit variables for the ADDTREE and SSA solu- 
tions were operationalized using two common mea- 
sures, Kruskal's stress (indicating "badness of fit"), and 
the linear R2 (indicating "goodness of fit"). Table 3 lists 
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TABLE 3 
DATA SETS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES OF FIT AND ATTRIBUTE ABSTRACTION 
Variance explained by latent roots 
Tree 2-D space 3-D space 2-D space 3-D space 
Data set stress stress stress Tree R2 R2 R2 1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 
Airlines .060 .096 .047 .949 .890 .937 .583 .731 .781 .824 .863 
Beverages .049 .061 .026 .930 .875 .902 .515 .689 .767 .833 .878 
Breakfast foods .091 .079 .050 .787 .925 .956 .507 .707 .814 .862 .903 
Cereals .061 .091 .001 .915 .829 .803 .503 .597 .675 .741 .800 
Chevrolets .060 .065 .025 .930 .871 .925 .402 .562 .655 .737 .799 
Cola soft drinks .052 .070 .047 .930 .880 .941 .433 .559 .623 .677 .729 
Dining out #1 .039 .051 .026 .954 .885 .910 .487 .658 .759 .821 .875 
Dining out #2 .047 .051 .009 .948 .803 .946 .443 .641 .740 .816 .882 
Drinking places .059 .031 .001 .886 .865 .890 .420 .563 .684 .767 .827 
Entertainment #1 .085 .191 .123 .719 .577 .737 .379 .496 .591 .679 .759 
Entertainment #2 .076 .184 .102 .735 .616 .724 .478 .611 .703 .786 .852 
Exercise alts. .065 .138 .090 .856 .730 .819 .460 .612 .714 .781 .833 
Fast foods places .065 .087 .049 .908 .812 .894 .520 .590 .657 .722 .780 
Female apparel #1 .043 .014 .005 .970 .975 .989 .567 .778 .841 .896 .926 
Female apparel #2 .047 .046 .029 .939 .897 .899 .539 .676 .760 .826 .873 
Gums .065 .102 .051 .921 .825 .857 .390 .544 .617 .680 .742 
Ice cream places .075 .053 .014 .914 .902 .958 .419 .594 .681 .744 .799 
Luxury autos .064 .069 .036 .917 .916 .897 .559 .767 .846 .892 .928 
Magazines .061 .128 .066 .823 .647 .786 .382 .518 .617 .701 .769 
Male apparel .038 .067 .031 .947 .919 .929 .593 .709 .781 .826 .868 
MBA programs .087 .121 .061 .805 .820 .907 .543 .631 .699 .750 .794 
Meeting places .068 .079 .017 .909 .899 .941 .531 .687 .800 .860 .902 
News sources .074 .083 .036 .922 .859 .900 .496 .592 .671 .740 .798 
Rent-a-cars #1 .054 .078 .044 .933 .871 .910 .536 .649 .713 .769 .815 
Rent-a-cars #2 .064 .111 .057 .886 .779 .824 .615 .755 .818 .870 .914 
Shampoo .056 .088 .050 .917 .879 .928 .516 .616 .689 .753 .799 
Snacks #1 .071 .150 .073 .557 .670 .760 .488 .648 .768 .881 .943 
Snacks #2 .040 .034 .006 .976 .952 .961 .430 .648 .723 .786 .839 
Soft drinks .052 .096 .062 .889 .832 .843 .449 .628 .743 .810 .870 
Sports alts. .080 .085 .043 .900 .921 .958 .675 .743 .780 .813 .843 
Toothpastes .091 .167 .112 .825 .791 .850 .478 .598 .689 .761 .814 
all 31 data sets (in alphabetical order) and the measures 
used to operationalize attribute abstraction and fit. 
Column 1 lists the data sets; columns 2, 3, and 4 list 
measures of Kruskal's stress for the ADDTREE, two- 
dimensional SSA, and three-dimensional SSA, respec- 
tively; and columns 5, 6, and 7 list corresponding mea- 
sures of R2. Finally, columns 8 through 12 give the five 
measures of attribute abstraction as measured by the 
explanatory power of latent roots obtained by principal 
components analysis. The correlation matrix for the 
measures in Table 3 is presented in Table 4. 
Analysis 
To facilitate an understanding of the analysis, the 
model just outlined is stated here in equation form. As 
mentioned, if attribute representations are very abstract, 
a small number of principal components should ac- 
count for much of the variance in the similarity judg- 
ments. We operationalize abstractness as a construct 
that is formed by five indicators: the variance explained 
by the first latent root (xi); the variance explained by 
roots one and two (x2); the variance explained by roots 
one through three (X3); the variance explained by roots 
one through four (x4); and the variance explained by 
roots one through five (x5). Thus, we can express our 
notion of abstractness (Q) as: 
X2 
7= [rxl, Wx2, Wx3, Wx4, WxS] X3 
where wrX to 1rx5 are parameters to be estimated. 
Thus, our latent variable, abstractness, is operation- 
alized as a weighted index of the explanatory power of 
the five latent root measures from principal compo- 
nents. These indicators are, by definition, correlated. It 
is the increment in variance explained that constitutes 
the difference between the measures. With respect to 
the latent variable, "abstractness," we would expect a 
closer correspondence between the measured and the 
latent when few latent roots account for a large portion 
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TABLE 4 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR MEASURES OF FIT AND ATTRIBUTE ABSTRACTION 
Variance explained by latent roots 
Tree 2-D space 3-D space Tree 2-D space 3-D space 
stress stress stress R2 R2 R2 1 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 
Tree stress 1.000 
2-D space stress 0.646 1.000 
3-D space stress 0.581 0.922 1.000 
Tree R2 -0.616 -0.756 -0.673 1.000 
2-D space R2 -0.394 -0.853 -0.748 0.742 1.000 
3-D spaceR2 -0.322 -0.815 -0.682 0.702 0.911 1.000 
Root 1 -0.021 -0.160 -0.145 0.187 0.414 0.319 1.000 
Roots 1-2 -0.211 -0.372 -0.312 0.254 0.547 0.445 0.842 1.000 
Roots 1-3 -0.199 -0.349 -0.300 0.136 0.476 0.365 0.725 0.960 1.000 
Roots 1-4 -0.194 -0.280 -0.255 -0.006 0.344 0.236 0.621 0.889 0.974 1.000 
Roots 1-5 -0.192 -0.221 -0.215 -0.088 0.234 0.131 0.523 0.815 0.930 0.987 1.000 
of the variance. In other words, we eventually expect 
the loadings3 to become smaller as more roots are added 
to explain variance. The endogenous variables are op- 
erationalized as: 
rYi7 Xy1 0 07 Ei 
Y2_ -Xyr, 0 0 __ 
_3 0 xv 0 II~ 
j4 0 Xy4 0 IL4I 
251 0 0 XY K 3 ( 
LY6I 0 0 6 LE6I 
where 
y = Fit of tree according to Kruskal's stress. 
Y2= Fit of tree according to R2. 
Y3 = Fit of two-dimensional MDS solution according to 
Kruskal's stress. 
Y4= Fit of two-dimensional MDS solution according 
to R2. 
Y5 = Fit of three-dimensional MDS solution according 
to Kruskal's stress. 
A6 = Fit of three-dimensional MDS solution according 
to R2. 
Xy, to XY6 are parameters to be estimated. 
71l to 13 are composites of tree fit, two-dimensional MDS 
fit, and three-dimensional MDS fit, respectively. 
I to E6 are residuals. 
As abstractness increases we expect the improvement 
in fit to be greater for the space models (multidimen- 
sional scaling) than for the tree model. To test this, we 
estimate the relationships between the unobservable 
construct, "abstractness," (, and the composite fit in- 
dices, 71 , 72, and 7)3. We can write this as: 
where 'Yl to Y3 are parameters to be estimated, and , 
to 3 are residuals. 
We standardize such that E(x) = E(y) = E(n) = E(t) 
= 0 and Var (7i) = Var (j) = Var (Xk) = Var (Yr) = 1, 
all i, j, k, r. With respect to the residual structure, we 
assume that E(ni') = E(?) = E(?t') = E(?E') = 0. 
Because of the nature of the sample (31 product 
groups) and the data, estimation was done via partial 
least squares (Fornell and Bookstein 1982; Wold 1982). 
The results, along with a graphical presentation of these 
equations, are provided in the Figure. 
Results 
Overall, the results show that fit improves with in- 
creasing levels of abstractness, and as hypothesized, that 
"space fitting" benefits more than "tree fitting." The 
relationships between abstractness and the two com- 
posites of "space fit" are substantively stronger (0.74 
and 0.70) than that between abstractness and "tree fit" 
(0.56). Further, the construct of "abstractness" alone 
accounts for a substantial amount of the variation in 
the various fit measures. As shown in Table 5, abstract- 
ness explains about 50 percent of the total variance in 
the space fits. As expected, this is very different from 
the tree fit, whose variance is not accounted for nearly 
as well (0.32 for the composite, 0.20 for stress, and 0.30 
for R2). Thus, there appears to be a considerably stron- 
ger relationship between abstractness and fitting via 
multidimensional scaling than between abstractness and 
fitting via tree clustering. 
By questioning the main assumption underlying the 
model, we offer an alternative explanation of these re- I The loadings are A, = R 
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sults. Although the model assumes that a small number 
of large latent roots indicates an abstract representation, 
it may be the number of aspects alone and not abstract- 
ness per se that is driving the results. Inherently, a fea- 
ture-based tree will capture more aspects than a two- 
or three-dimensional space. Therefore, if our abstract- 
ness construct actually reflects the number of aspects 
in a representation independent of abstractness, one 
would expect the same results. However, two important 
observations support an interpretation based on ab- 
stractness rather than number of aspects only. First, 
abstractness was measured by the explanatory power of 
a small number of latent roots rather than by the num- 
ber of significant roots. Although very similar, the 
former follows more directly from the notion of an at- 
tribute hierarchy in which very few abstract attributes 
are required to describe any particular product. Second, 
and most importantly, an interpretation that relies only 
on ''number of aspects" is inconsistent with the results 
of both Experiment 1 and the pilot studies. 
With respect to the measurement properties of the 
model, we note that all endogenous measures have high 
loadings. For the exogenous construct, the Fornell- 
Larcker index (Fornell and Larcker 1981) is well below 
0.5. Part of this is due to the fact that the incremental 
information in each indicator following the third root 
is small. Nevertheless, since abstractness is an exoge- 
nous variable that is expressed as a deterministic func- 
tion of its indicators, the large residual variance does 
not have drastic implications (Fornell and Bookstein 
1982). Recall that the purpose here is to construct a 
linear combination of x variables in such a way that the 
error variances of the endogenous variables are mini- 
mized.4 
TABLE 5 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF PLS MODEL 
Model fit Statistics 
R 2 
Tree fit .32 
2-D Space fit .55 
3-D Space fit .49 
Operational variance (redundancy) 
Tree fit 
Stress .20 
R 2 .30 
2-D Space fit 
Stress .50 
R 2 .52 
3-D Space fit 
Stress .36 
R 2 .45 
Fornell-Larcker measurement index 
Abstractness .18 
Tree fit .78 
2-D Space fit .92 
3-D Space fit .83 
To summarize, the results of Experiment 2 are con- 
sistent with those of Experiment 1 and the pilot studies. 
Taken together, the experiments strongly support the 
relationship between attribute concreteness-abstract- 
ness and the use of features or dimensions. In addition, 
the results of Experiment 2 show the significance of the 
research hypotheses. The ability of similarity scaling 
procedures to fit similarity judgments depends on the 
nature of the underlying product representations. The 
more abstract or noncomparable the alternatives, the 
better multidimensional scaling analyses capture or fit 
consumer judgments relative to feature-based additive 
trees. 
DISCUSSION 
The experiments reported here support a general 
relationship between the abstractness of products, the 
abstractness of their attributes, and whether these 
attributes resemble features or dimensions. Abstract 
products tend to have more abstract attribute represen- 
tations. In addition, more abstract representations gen- 
erally contain more dimensions, while concrete repre- 
sentations contain more features. The relationship be- 
tween attribute abstraction and the use of features or 
dimensions was supported using qualitatively different 
research methods. 
' We acknowledge the possibility that our latent root measures of 
abstractness might be considered as reflective rather than formative. 
As a result, the model was tested treating the x variables as both 
formative and reflective. The resulting relationships were quite robust 
and only marginally affected by the formative or reflective specifi- 
cation. 
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The experimental results are very consistent with 
findings in the psychological literature concerning both 
the nature of basic-level categories and the represen- 
tation of perceptual versus conceptual stimuli. Both the 
pilot studies of Johnson and Kisielius (1985) and Ex- 
periment 1 reveal larger differences between superor- 
dinate and more basic, category-level stimuli than be- 
tween category and brand-level stimuli. As noted in Ex- 
periment 1, this is consistent with the studies of Rosch 
et al. (1976) that find relatively small differences in ab- 
straction below basic-level categories. (Recall that very 
few additional attributes are required to describe cate- 
gories below this level.) We also suggested that although 
dimensional spaces become more appropriate the more 
abstract the product representation, feature-based trees 
may, on average, provide better representations of 
product concepts (consistent with the findings of Tver- 
sky and Hutchinson 1986 and Pruzansky et al. 1982). 
The data in Table 3 support this contention. Although 
ADDTREE uses slightly fewer parameters than does a 
two-dimensional SSA solution (Sattath and Tversky 
1977), the fit of the ADDTREEs in Table 3 was, on 
average, superior to the fit of the two-dimensional spaces 
(the average ADDTREE stress and linear R2 measures 
equaled 0.063 and 0.884, respectively, while the cor- 
responding averages for the two-dimensional spaces 
were 0.089 and 0.836). 
A potential problem of the research reported here, 
specifically Experiment 1, is the reliability of subjects' 
ability to both distinguish between features and dimen- 
sions and rate attribute concreteness-abstractness. 
While the psychological difference between features and 
dimensions is often assumed, the judges in Experiment 
1 were actually asked to classify specific product attri- 
butes according to their use as features or dimensions. 
That the three judges agreed in classifying over 80 per- 
cent of the attributes supports the psychological validity 
of the feature-dimension distinction. In addition, only 
the attributes on which the judges were in agreement 
were used to test Hypothesis 2. Subjects also appear to 
be able to produce reliable estimates of attribute con- 
creteness-abstractness. The concreteness-abstractness 
ratings obtained by Johnson (1984), and used in the 
Johnson and Kisielius (1985) pilot studies, were very 
consistent with those obtained and used in Experiment 
1 reported here. Thus the experimental results do not 
appear to be artifacts of the ratings required to opera- 
tionalize both attribute concreteness-abstractness and 
feature-dimensionality. 
These findings should help focus the use of both the- 
ory and methodology in consumer research. Theoreti- 
cally, as different choice models presume different rep- 
resentations, knowing what representation to expect 
may help predict strategy use. A lexicographic strategy 
(Coombs 1964), for example, assumes a dimensional 
representation (Garner 1978). Consumers using this 
strategy choose the alternative that ranks highest on 
their most important dimension. In contrast, feature- 
based representations are implicit in models such as 
elimination by aspects (Tversky 1972; Tversky and Sat- 
tath 1979). The results here suggest that, because con- 
crete alternatives tend to be represented using features, 
strategies such as elimination by aspects may be more 
likely to be used than dimensional strategies such as 
the lexicographic rule. Conversely, because abstract or 
noncomparable alternatives may be thought of more 
dimensionally, dimensional strategies may be more 
likely to be used. Methodologically, as demonstrated 
in Experiment 2, the use of similarity scaling procedures 
may depend on the nature of consumers' underlying 
representations. The more abstract the representations, 
the more insight dimensionally based scaling procedures 
may provide, while feature-based procedures may be 
more useful in analyzing more concrete representations. 
As cautioned earlier, however, either technique may be 
useful for analyzing both concrete and abstract repre- 
sentations depending on the objectives of the analysis. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Several factors that were not studied here may directly 
affect the relationship between the abstractness of a 
representation and the use of features or dimensions. 
One such factor is the risk or error at stake in making 
a judgment or choice. Consider that dimensions may 
be more precise and, hence, more informative than fea- 
tures. If so, concrete attributes may be represented as 
dimensionally as possible when the choice is an im- 
portant one. While consumers may only care to rep- 
resent two thermos bottles as being able to keep food 
"hot," the same consumers may think more precisely 
about just "how hot" two prospective homes may be 
in the winter. A product's complexity at a given level 
of abstraction should also have some effect on repre- 
sentation. Faced with a product that must be described 
on a disproportionately large number of attributes, 
consumers may use more features. Alternatively, or in 
addition, consumers may have an incentive to represent 
the same information using fewer, more abstract attri- 
butes (Johnson 1986). Still other factors, including 
consumer knowledge and product type, should also be 
considered. Further exploration of these factors should 
continue to provide insights into the nature and meth- 
odological implications of the cognitive representation 
of products. 
[Received October 1985. Revised February 1987.] 
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